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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
AIR EASEMENT: OKLAHOMA ADOPTS THE
TRESPASS-NUISANCE DICHOTOMY
In a case of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Henthorn v. Oklahoma City held that the ultimate issue
in determining a landowner's right to recover for the taking
of an air easement was whether the interference with the
use and enjoyment of the land by low flying airplanes was
so substantial as to constitute a "taking."' Plaintiff, appealing
from an adverse jury verdict, contended that it was error
for the trial court to have submitted the question of a "taking"
to the jury where the uncontroverted evidence established
daily, frequent and continuous jet aircraft flights over his
land at altitudes of less than 500 feet.2 In rejecting this con-
tention, the court held that the gravamen of the action is
"whether there was an interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the land, due to the low, frequent, continuous over-
flights of jet aircraft." (court's emphasis)3
The rule adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court ac-
cords with the landmark case United States v. Causby4 which
represents a unique combination of nuisance and trespass law.
Causby involved continuous overflights by military aircraft
sixty feet above plaintiff's chicken farm. The lights, noise,
glare and danger of accidents had made the plaintiff's prem-
ises uninhabitable and resulted in the destruction of his chick-
ens. The Court held that the landowner had exclusive con-
trol of the superadjacent airspace.
[I]f the landowner is to have full enjoyment of
the land, he must have exclusive control of the im-
mediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere . . .
The landowner owns at least as much of the space
above the ground as he can occupy or use in connec-
tion with the land. . . The superadjacent airspace
1 453 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1969).
2 Id. at 1015.
3 Id. at 1016.
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at this low altitude is so close to the land that con-
tinuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface
of the land itself. We think the landowner, as an in-
cident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that
invasions of it are in the same category as invasions
of the surface.0
At first impression, the Court appears to be establishing a
trespass theory of recovery. Under traditional common law
concepts, a showing of damage was not necessary in a trespass
action because a cause of action could sound on a "technical
trespass." Furthermore, "he who owned the soil owned it to
the heavens." However, the Court clearly rejects both of these
concepts by stating:
The airplane is part of the modern environment of
life, and the inconveniences which it causes are nor-
mally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above
the land, is part of the public domain. We need not
determine at this time what those precise limits are.
Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they
are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and im-
mediate interference with the enjoyment and use of
the land.7 (emphasis added)
Therefore, the Court reasoned that isolated invasions of the
superadjacent airspace are privileged. The Court is thereby
inferentially using nuisance law to formulate a concept of a
privileged trespass.
Traditionally, nuisances created by governmental activity
were referred to as incidental damages not rising to the dig-
nity of a "taking" required by the Fifth Amendment. It is
interesting to note that approximately half of the state con-
4 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
I Munro, Aircraft Noise as a Taking of Property, 13 N.Y.L.F.
476 (1967).
0 328 U.S. at 264-65.
7 Id. at 266.
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stitutions, including Oklahoma, require compensation for a
"taking or damaging. ' 8 The difference is significant. T h e
Supreme Court stated in United States v. Willow River
Power Co.: "[D]amage alone gives courts no power to re-
quire compensation where there is not an actual taking of
property."9 What is required is a direct, permanent, physical
invasion amounting to appropriation and not mere injury.10
Damage, however, is a completely different concept and in-
dicates a "purpose not to confine recovery to cases where
there is physical invasion of property affected."'" Recovery
is authorized under the Oklahoma Constitution "although
there is no physical invasion or property damage . . . [and
although] damage is temporary."'1
The Causby court, therefore, was consistent with the
traditional concept of a "taking" by requiring a direct physical
invasion. However, in view of the court's added requirement
of measuring the degree of interference on a case-by-case
basis, one could conclude that the physical invasion require-
ment is irrelevant. The problem has been accentuated by
modern technology. It is the noise, smoke and vibrations which
destroy the use of property and not the passage through a
narrow airspace by the physical corpus of the plane. The sig-
nificant factor is the end result, interference with property
use, and not the particular location of the agent. As shall be
later discussed, this appears to be the attitude of the Okla-
homa Court in H.enthorn although this issue was not direct-
ly decided by the court.
8 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 24 states in part: Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation. (emphasis added)
0 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945).
10 Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
n Stedman v. State Highway Comm'n, 174 Okla. 308, 50 P.2d
657 (1935).
12 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Prigmore, 180 Okla. 124, 68
P.2d 90, 91 (1937).
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Causby left unanswered the question of whether flights
above five hundred feet or flights adjacent to plaintiff's prop-
erty could ever constitute a "taking". However, Causby has
been narrowly construed by some courts to require an actual
physical trespass through the above column of air before re-
covery will be allowed.13 Smoke, noise and vibrations are not
physical invasions but mere inconveniences. 14 Completely
ignored by these opinions are cases which hold that sound
waves or shock waves from blasting constitute a physical in-
vasion because they set in motion destructive forces.
In this writer's opinion, the courts which rigidly adhere
to the rule requiring a physical invasion of the superadjacent
airspace are attempting to foster a public policy of protecting
the development of aviation. In view of present adverse pub-
lic opinion concerning the environmental effects of aviation,
it is not surprising to see a new line of cases, although a dis-
tinct minority, being based on a nuisance theory which pro-
vides a landowner protection against any unreasonable in-
terference with the use of his land. The development of the
nuisance theory of recovery has not been widespread because
the action has traditionally been tied to injunctive relief which
often ran counter to public interest in fostering the growth
of aviation. This balancing of competing interests has pro-
duced cases like Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. which
declared certain noxious activities of a railroad as a "legalized
public nuisance."' 5
In Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, the court has apparently
rejected the requirement of a direct physical invasion of the
airspace. Although this precise issue was not in question, the
11 Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964). For a
state case, see Ferguson v. City of Keene, 238 A.2d 1 (N.H.
1968).
14 Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla.
1958).
15 233 U.S. 546 (1914); cf. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.,
55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
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court cited with approval the following authorities which
rely on a nuisance theory of recovery: Thornburg v. Port of
Portland,16 Judge Murrah's dissent in Batten v. United
States,27 and the Restatement of Torts.18
In Thornburg, the court was faced with an inverse con-
demnation action in which it was alleged that systematic
flights adjacent to plaintiff's land constituted a continuing
nuisance resulting in a compensable "taking" under the Ore-
gon Constitution. The court held that Causby, which requir-
ed a showing of physical invasion, did not foreclose an in-
quiry into whether repeated nuisances could constitute a
"taking". The court stated:
[T]here is a question, in each case, as a matter
of fact, whether or not the governmental activity
complained of has resulted in so substantial an in-
terference with use and enjoyment of one's land as
,to amount to a taking of private property for pub-
lic use. This factual question, again barring some rule
which says we may not ask it, is equally relevant
whether the taking is trespassory or by a nuisance.10
The trial court had instructed the jury that only flights be-
low five hundred feet could be considered in determining if
there had been a "taking". The Oregon Supreme Court in
discussing this instruction and the requirement that the flights
be directly overhead stated:
If he is in fact ousted from the legitimate enjoy-
ment of his land, it is to him an academic matter
that the planes which have ousted him did not fly
below 500 ft. The rule adopted by the majority of the
state and federal courts is, then, an arbitrary one.
... It is sterile formality to say that the govern-
ment takes an easement in private property when it
repeatedly sends aircraft directly over the land at
10 233 Ore. 396, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
17 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), (dissenting opinion).
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (1965).
10 233 Ore. at 401, 376 P.2d at 105.
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altitudes so low as to render the land unusable by
its owner, but does not take an easement when it
sends aircraft a few feet to the right or left of the
perpendicular boundaries2 0
In referring to Thornburg, the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
in deciding Henthorn, stated:
The Oregon Court in a well reasoned opinion on the
theory of nuisance discussed both theories of the
plaintiff in light of the 500 foot rule and the boundary
line rule... and in much the same way that Judge
Murrah reasoned in Batten, decided that the main
question is not the height above the land or whether
it is directly over the land but whether the con-
tinuing interference is substantial enough to con-
stitute a taking.& 2
In Batten v. United States, the plaintiffs were deluged
with smoke, noise and vibrations caused by jets warming up
on an adjacent runway. The majority characterized this as
mere consequential damages since Causby required direct
overflights before there could be a taking. Invasions of super-
adjacent airspace were equated with invasions of the sur-
face and, therefore, a direct physical invasion was required.
Judge Murrah, in a vigorous dissent, argued:
It is true that, in the very nature of things, most
constitutional takings are accompanied by actual
physical invasion.... But, the Government may sure-
ly accomplish by indirect interference the equivalent
of an outright physical invasion.22
The constitutional test, Judge Murrah asserted, is "first,
whether the asserted interest is one which the law will pro-
tect; if so, whether the interference is sufficiently direct, suf-
ficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to cause us to
conclude that fairness and justice, as between the state and
the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the
20 233 Ore. at 405, 376 P.2d at 109.
21 453 P.2d at 1015.
22 306 F.2d at 586.
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public and not by the individual alone."' 2 If his colleagues
were relying on the fact that the taking was not sufficiently
direct, peculiar and grave to justify the finding of a taking,
Judge Murrah asked: "[A]t what point the interference rises
to the dignity of a 'taking'? Is it when the window glass
rattles, or when it falls out; when the smoke suffocates the
inhabitants, or merely makes them cough; when the noise
makes family conversation difficult, or when it stifles it en-
tirely?"24
The Restatement 2d after defining "immediate reaches"
as a matter of degree to be determined as a question of fact
goes on to state: "Even though the flight is not within the
'immediate reaches' of the airspace, it may still unreasonably
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the land. In such case
the liability will rest upon the basis of nuisance rather than
trespass.125 The Oklahoma Court said it wasn't necessarily
adopting this test, but only used it to illustrate that the ques-
tion of height is a viable concept in relation to interference
with the land.
The physical invasion trespass theory was developed in
the propellor age and in this writer's view, this theory has
little relevance in the supersonic jet age where we are more
concerned with the very real problems of smoke, vibration
and noise as opposed to a direct physical invasion. Of course,
some inconveniences caused by governmental activity must
be borne without compensation, but the Causby court could
not have anticipated the approaching decibel onslaught which
would render a plane's location largely irrevelant in determin-
ing the extent of the injury.
The Oklahoma Court is not holding that a landowner may
bring a cause of action based on a "repeated nuisance" theory.
In Henthorn, while there was a direct physical invasion of
2 Id. at 587.
24 Id.
25 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 18.
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the superadjacent airspace, the jury simply found that there
was no interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.
The court held that both of these elements were indispens-
able in order for there to be a "taking" and that it was prop-
erly a question for the jury to decide. However, since a con-
siderable part of the opinion discusses the virtues of the
nuisance theory of recovery, it would appear that a landowner
may, in a future case, successfully allege a taking without
the showing of a physical invasion of the superadjacent air-
space. The court indicates this possibility when it stated that
a landowner must show not only a substantial interference
but that the flights were "low, continuous, frequent flights
or in close proximity to plaintiff's property."26 (emphasis sup-
plied) It is submitted that Oklahoma may join the small
minority of jurisdictions that have rejected the physical in-
vasion concept in the taking of air easements.
Gerald J. Goodwin
26 453 P.2d at 1016. For another case dispensing with the re-
quirement of overflights, see Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989
(1965).
27 453 P.2d at 1016.
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